Introduction
To the surprise of most observers in the West, Hamas has won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections by a large majority. No doubt, the situation emerging is anything but clear, and the implications of the elections to any future political process are not yet determined. However, no sooner than the victory of Hamas was declared, Israeli “experts” from the academia and the political and security establishments stormed the news and talk shows studios, predicting with unabashed authority that a Hamas-dominated Palestine would become an Iranian proxy at best, or an Iran-like terrorist state at worst. Thus, for example, former head of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) Avi Dichter declared in an interview: “they [meaning the Hamas leadership] need to define their status and choose which direction to take. They need to decide whether they want to go with Iran or Israel.”

These responses and others of the kind are instructive for a number of reasons, but mainly because they betray a primary narrative device at work to obscure the concrete colonial context of the occupation, which, incidentally, would also go a long way towards explaining how and why Hamas managed to win the Palestinian parliamentary election in the first place. Edward Said reminds us of the inevitable, ubiquitous discursive mechanisms designed to ensure the erasure of the “imperial background” of many a history, as though “the interpretation of cultures, of texts and of other people occurs in an unchanging vacuum, totally devoid of any mental inhibition or interest.” One such mechanism, which Israelis in the position of power, as well as their allies in academia, regularly employ in order to divert attention from the realities of the occupation, is the trope of the “Iranization” of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In what follows, then, I would like to tackle the controversy over Iran’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by relocating it from the realm of mythology to the realm of history. Aimé Césaire instructs us that “poetic knowledge is born in the great silence of sci-
Although I reject the notion that science is necessarily distinct from poet-
ics, I will nevertheless try to historicize this controversial subject – drawing on my own research
on the one hand and on existing “scientific” literature on the other. This, no doubt, is no small
task. In the first place, this history, despite its evident manifestations and turning points, has
been fraught with many contradictions and ambivalences. What is more, it has either been
silenced or amplified, depending on the circumstances and on regime changes in Iran (and
elsewhere). Thus, for example, while the Shah regime was hardly anxious to speak up on the
conflict, the Islamic regime could hardly keep quiet about it. In both cases, the actual extent
of Iranian involvement in the conflict remains unclear. These circumstances alone illustrate
that the history of Iran’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been shaped by
perceptions (including my own) no less than by actual socio-political processes.

However, before proceeding any further it is necessary to view more closely the “poetics”
of the Iran-Palestine collusion. Such poetics, as Ashis Nandy suggests, are “authentic”, even
if they are located only in the myths people live by. These poetics may be “false”, but an analy-
sis of them is likely to help us to gain a better sense of how the Israelis have come to under-
stand and experience conflict. Thus, history matters, even if it is only concerned with ahis-
torical narratives and representations.

“Palestinization” of Iran and/or “Iranization” of Palestine

Allegations of the Iran-Palestine “ unholy alliance” are at least as old as the 1979 Iranian
revolution. As I have shown elsewhere, the 1979 revolution is where the poetics of Iran’s
involvement in the conflict all begin. Having signed a peace agreement with Egypt – the Arab
world’s most dominant power – Israel found in the Iranian revolution the opportunity it need-
ed not only to replace an old foe with a new foe (Iran), but also to create an “incriminating”
link between this new foe and the PLO, to which Israel was still adamantly opposed. This
explains the representations of the unfolding revolution in Iran as a Khomeini-Arafat co-pro-
duction in Israeli discourse. At times, too, Israeli commentators had even “Palestinianized”
the revolution altogether. Consider, for instance, Amnon Rubinstein, who, as Knesset mem-
ber of the Zionist center-left DASH Party, asserted that “Khomeini was actually a product of
the PLO”. It suddenly seemed to Israeli analysts that Iran was entirely in the grip of militant
Palestinians. The infamous hostage crisis, which began in Iran on 4 November 1979 and
lasted for 444 days, was said to have been engineered by radical Palestinian groups. The Israeli
press thus alarmingly reported that “students inside the […] embassy and on the outside
chanted in unison pro-Palestinian slogans such as ‘Filastin, Filastin, Ally of Our Country’”.

The fusion between Iran and the Palestinians in Israeli discourse continued intermit-
tently from 1979. However, Israel’s preoccupation with the playing up of the Iran-Palestine
“collusion” took a sharp turn in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US.
While in 1979-1980 Israeli analysts and observers envisioned a Palestinian takeover of Iran,
in the aftermath of September 2001 they envisioned an Iranian takeover of the Palestinian
Authority. In the first instance they talked about the Palestinization of Iran; in the second, they
talked about the Iranization of Palestine. The immediate cause of this shift was the likeli-
hood of US-Iranian rapprochement after years of mutual hostility. Since both the US and
Iran opposed the Taliban regime, the Bush Administration hoped to garner Iranian sup-
port for the war in Afghanistan. These efforts were crowned with partial success. Despite
its opposition to the war, Iran agreed to perform search-and-rescue missions for downed US
pilots over Iranian territory and to donate millions of dollars for Afghanistan’s post-war rehabilitation. The Israeli press closely monitored these acts of good will between the US and Iran, while the Israeli political and security establishments became increasingly frustrated by the intention of the US to leave Israel out of the anti-terrorist coalition (and perhaps include Iran instead!); “it appears”, as Zvi Barel of Haaretz noted with a speck of irony, “that [Iran] is about to become the next candidate, after Libya, to be accepted to the American club”.

The poetics of the Iranization of Palestine seemed to have been validated in early January 2002, when the Israeli navy intercepted the “Karine-A”, a Gaza-bound freighter allegedly carrying 50 tons of weaponry from Iran. The “Karine-A” was Israel’s version of a “smoking gun”: “Tehran has deepened its involvement in the [Palestinian] territories by [...] supplying arms to the [Islamic] Jihad and training its members for terrorist activities.” According to Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, the seizure of the arms ship “confirmed the intimate connection between the PA on the one hand and Iran and related terrorist elements who are interested in the destruction of Israel on the other hand”. Alarmingly, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon even went as far as to implicate Israeli Palestinians as accomplices, and beneficiaries, of Iranian terrorism. The gist of the argument thus ran like this: if it were not for the interception of the ship at sea, “Israel would have found itself waging an all-inclusive war against Iran on two fronts [i.e. Lebanon and the PA], without Tehran having to cover its hands with dirt”. Arafat and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, seemingly rose above their “mutual disgust” in order to “rekindle the flames of the Intifada”.

Israel’s campaign to exaggerate Iran’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict eventually paid off. On January 29, 2002, while delivering the State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush incorporated Iran, together with Iraq and North Korea, into an “axis of evil”, and accused Iran of aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction and exporting terror. The Israeli establishment responded with a sigh of relief, if not outright exhilaration. It was also noted that all Israeli misgivings about the likelihood of US-Iranian conciliation have been removed and that Israel and the US have finally agreed on their strategic visions.

However, the poetics of the Iranization of Palestine cannot be explained by immediate, practical concerns alone. Official Israeli efforts to cast an Iranian shadow over the PA were also driven by a well-calculated, post-9/11 desire to amplify the inherently narrow boundaries of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a potentially catastrophic war of global proportions. By exaggerating Iran’s backing of Palestinian acts of terror, Israel sought to convey the impression that the conflict corresponded, albeit on a small scale, to the global alignment of forces in the fight between Western (read “Judeo-Christian”) civilization and world (read “Islamic”) terrorism. In doing so, it hoped to gain international consent for its continued repressive measures against the Palestinian populace. This explains why Effi Eitam, a right-wing retired IDF general, was able to get away with what can be easily described as a dangerous apocalyptic construction of the Iran-Palestine collusion. The “danger”, he said, “lies in the deterioration of the region into a fanatic religious war that will not be able to be stopped other than by the use of terrible means. I want to make it clear that I do not think we should use weapons of mass destruction. But I do think that in order to avoid a situation like that, we have to vanquish Arafat along with Iraq and Iran as one package. It is impossible to talk with them, impossible to effect conciliation with them, they have to be vanquished. There is no other way.” Not too many people disapproved of Mr. Eitam’s statement. On the contrary,
a couple of weeks after releasing this outrageous statement, Eitam was elected Chairman of the Mafdal (Religious National) Party. He was then appointed as Minister without Portfolio in Sharon’s Government, becoming a full-fledged member of that government’s Security Cabinet.

Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: a short history

Let me try to tell a different history of Iran’s involvement in the conflict. It begins at the present, moving our way backwards in time: speaking in October 2005 at a program called “A World without Zionism”, Iran’s new hard-line president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, told a group of students that Israel must be “wiped off the map”. That, he said, would be needed in order for a Palestinian state to be established, adding: “the skirmishes in the occupied land are part of the war of destiny. The outcome of hundreds of years of war will be defined in Palestinian land”.21

Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israel rhetoric, which immediately drew global censure, has rarely been voiced by top Iranian officials ever since the early days of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Indeed, Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric seemed to embarrass even hard-line factions within the Iranian regime. Fearful of additional international outrage, the government swiftly backed off from the president’s remarks, but also reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to what it defined as a “just” resolution of the Palestinian-Israel conflict (see below).22

The Ahmadinejad scandal, as this affair might be called, clearly represents a radical shift in Iranian views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that dates back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Until 1979, Iran was not so much interested in the internal dynamics of the conflict as it was in cultivating relations with the Jewish state in various fields. Dubbed by an Israeli scholar as a “wondrous love affair”,23 Iranian-Israeli relations were founded on a combination of strategic, economic and ideological interests, many of them inimical both to the “progressive” Arab states and to the Palestinians. Indeed, from a Palestinian perspective, the “Iranian-Israeli connection” as it evolved since 1948 was nothing short of shameful. To begin with, in 1949 Israel received the Iranian Shah’s tacit agreement to use Iran as a transit point for illegal immigration of Iraqi Jews, in effect helping to tip the demographic balance in Palestine in the Jews’ favor.24 Equally detrimental to the Palestinians was the Shah’s entanglement in Cold War rivalries, which drew him into a close strategic alliance with the State of Israel. The Shah sought American tutelage to protect him against domestic forces of opposition (mainly the Shiite clergy and the Tudeh Communist Party) as well as from the radical Arab states (especially Nasserite Egypt).25 He hoped that an Iranian connection with the new Jewish state would help him to achieve that goal.26 It was for this reason, among others, that the Shah agreed to join Israel in the “alliance of the periphery”. This alliance was originally conceived by David Ben Gurion and his close advisors after the 1956 Suez War. Their basic idea was to leapfrog over the immediate circle of hostile (and pro-Soviet, pro-Palestinian) Arab states by forming alliances with the non-Arab states of the Middle East “periphery” (such as Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia).27

Iran and Israel drew closer together in the late 1950s, when the Shah sought the Israeli Mossad’s assistance in building and administrating the SAVAK, the Shah’s notorious secret police.28 Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah undertook the responsibility of ensuring peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region, in accordance with the precepts of the “Nixon Doctrine”. As a result, Iran became a crucial export market for Israeli arms, about $500 mil-
lion per year. These aspects of the Israeli-Iranian connection account for much of the anti-Israeli sentiment in Iran during and after the 1979 revolution.

And yet the Israeli-Iranian alliance under the Shah regime was not limited to military, security and intelligence matters. When the Shah embarked on his ambitious (“White Revolution”) modernization programs in the 1960s, he became increasingly dependent on Israeli know-how in the fields of technology, transportation, construction and agriculture. Thus, the initial security and intelligence alliances between the two countries expanded into sprawling business and financial initiatives that produced nice profits for Israeli companies and entrepreneurs. To illustrate, Israeli trade with Iran, which was estimated at $33 million in 1973-1974, sharply went up to $250 million on the eve of the revolution in 1977-1978. Iran reciprocated by agreeing to be one of the very few countries who were willing to defy the Arab oil boycott by publicly selling oil to the Israelis.

Thus many Israelis – in government positions, in the armed forces, in the security and intelligence services, and in the business sector – saw Iran as the land of unlimited opportunity. Consequently, Israeli-Iranian relations strengthened significantly over the years. Little wonder, then, that Eliezer (Geizi) Tsafir, Mossad’s last resident agent in Iran, grieved over the “loss” of Iran in the revolution noting that “If it were not for the fact that they destroyed the country, Iran could have been an excellent place to spend a few years in service”.

Not coincidently, this statement resonates well with Benjamin Disraeli’s famous dictum, that “the East is a career”.

It is worth remembering, however, that the Shah’s increasing interactions with Israel always ran the risk of provoking domestic and external opposition forces. To survive these threats, the Shah didn’t mind spending pro-Palestinian rhetoric. He was also able to claim, much to his own credit, that he had voted against the 1947 partition plan along with Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and even endorsed the notion of “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”. To overcome these forces of opposition, the Shah also had to conduct his relations with Israel under the veil of secrecy, consistently resisting an open courtship with the Jewish state. This explains why he always refrained from granting Israel more than de facto recognition. Israeli-Iranian relations under the Shah regime therefore came to be known as a “discreet entente”.

The 1967 June War had once again showed the Shah to be the master of ambivalence. In practice, the spectacular Israeli victory enhanced Tehran’s special relationship with Israel, for it neutralized the threat of Egyptian president ‘Abd al-Nasser’s Arab radicalism while also demonstrating that Soviet power in the region rested on flimsy grounds. In his public pronouncements, however, the Shah regime prudently denounced the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and called for Israeli withdrawal from these territories.

A substantive shift in the Shah’s policy toward the Middle East conflict occurred in the aftermath of the 1973 October War. While the Shah was determined to continue his basic ties with Israel, several developments set off by the war induced him to take a more open-handed position regarding the “Arab option”. Paradoxically or not, the 1973 war created a favorable environment for security and stability in the Middle East, mainly because it put Egypt in a better position to make peace with Israel, while also leading to the formation of a coalition of relatively moderate forces within the Arab world. Consequently, the Shah was able to show greater sensitivity to the Palestinians’ plight. He therefore sharpened his criticism of the enduring Israeli occupation, voiced strong opposition against the Israeli annex-
ation of Jerusalem, and upheld the Rabat Conference declaration of 1974, which designated the PLO as “the sole and legitimate” representative of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians were not particularly impressed by the Shah’s overtures. The memory of the Shah joining forces with Israel in 1970 in order to help Hashemite King Hussein to crush the “Black September” Palestinian uprising that threatened his throne was still fresh in their mind. In other words, the Shah could no longer hide his alignment with Israel and with the Arab “reactionary” states under the guise of pro-Palestinian declarations. By 1973, too, Palestinian guerilla groups in Lebanon were already providing valuable political and military training to various Iranian dissidents who would topple the monarchy in the 1979 revolution.

The collapse of the Iranian monarchy in the revolution heralded the severing of Iran’s ties with Israel. Iran’s relations with no other country in the world were so quickly overturned as its relations with Israel. As mentioned, one reason for this dramatic change was Israel’s close identification with the Shah regime and his repressive policies. Another reason was revolutionary Iran’s Islamist commitment to worldwide anti-colonial struggles, for which the Palestinian struggle soon emerged as a primary emblem. Quite intentionally, the decision to break relations with Israel was announced on the same day that Yasir Arafat arrived in Tehran as the first foreign leader to visit Iran after the revolution. He was received like a head of state and was handed over the keys to the building formerly belonging to the Israeli diplomatic delegation in Tehran.

Officially, it must be stated, the Islamic Republic of Iran does not recognize Israel as a legitimate state. Government declarations and publications often depict Israel as imperialism’s “illegitimate child”, which was “implanted” in the Middle East to perpetuate British and American “hegemonic designs”. Occasionally, too, Iranian political leaders praised the goal of Palestinian radical groups to eradicate Israel and replace it with a “reconstructed” Arab and Islamic Palestine. However, what the Islamic Republic of Iran has actually done in this regard is a totally different story. As revelations emanating from the “Iran-Contra affair” scandal (also known as “Iran-gate”) in the mid-1980s illustrate, the Khomeini regime has been willing to do business with Israel in ways reminiscent of the Shah regime. At the outset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the Iranian military – which was already weakened and demoralized by successive revolutionary purges in its ranks – suffered serious losses in the face of well-equipped and well-organized Iraqi forces. Faced with a likelihood of military defeat, the Khomeini regime turned to Israel – its avowed enemy and the ancient regime’s close ally – to purchase arms and spare parts on a large scale. According to reliable estimations, Iranian arm-deals with Israel after 1979 exceeded the $3 billion mark, thus proving to be more lucrative for Israel than its pre-1979 sales to the Shah. This, however, did not prevent the Khomeini regime from parroting such slogans as “Today Iran, tomorrow Palestine”.

On the declarative level, too, Iranian views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not been devoid of tensions and contradictions. The “charismatic era” of the Islamic Revolution (which coincides with the period of 1979-1989) had its share of intense anti-Israeli, pro-Palestinian rhetoric. However, this rhetoric subsided considerably during the second term of Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency in the 1990s, and even more so during the era of “reform” that was spearheaded in 1997 by President Muhammad Khatami. While falling short of recognizing the legitimacy of Israel, Iranian officials stated that Iran was not opposed to Israel and the Palestinians working out a “mutually satisfactory” resolution to their conflict. “Hard-line” President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who was sworn into office in August 2005, picked up where...
his predecessors left off. Declaring that the Jewish state must be “wiped off the map”, or at least “be moved to Europe”, and calling the Holocaust a myth, he sparked a barrage of international criticism. Explanations of Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israel statements varied from excessive zeal and political inexperience to a deliberate effort at self-promotion. There’s also speculation that the Ahmadinejad’s extreme anti-Israel rhetoric emanates from a mystical belief in a divine mission and heavenly oversight. Be that as it may, it is difficult to say how much high-level support Ahmadinejad enjoyed for his outspoken views. Beyond these differences, Iranian “reformists” and “hard-liners” seem to share many ideas about the nature and prospects of the Oslo and post-Oslo “peace process”. Indeed, Iranians of different ideological persuasions would agree that the “peace process” since the 1990s is incapable of resulting in genuine peace, mainly because it fails to address the substantive issues of “injustice” – such as the rights of Palestinian refugees from 1948, the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem, and the continued presence of Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territories.

However much official statements may help us in deciphering Iranian views on Israelis and Palestinians, they leave unanswered the crucial and controversial question of the actual extent of Iranian involvement in this conflict. As I showed in the previous section, one of the primary charges made against Iran by Israel (and the US) in recent years is that it has provided planning, training and funding for some of the many Palestinian terrorist attacks inside Israel and the territories. According to these charges, the “collision” between Iran and the Palestinian Authority intensified in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the Work Trade Center and the Pentagon.

There’s little doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been giving financial, military and moral support to such Palestinian groups as the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and that it has been using the Hezbollah to gain a strategic foothold among the Shiites of Lebanon. The question, of course, is one of proportion. Indeed, as I’ve noted above, there is sufficient ground to argue that Iran’s actual involvement in the conflict has been more limited in size and scope than Israel (or the US) would have us believe. The poetics of the Iranian-Palestinian collusion are, therefore, related to the Israeli project of imagining the conflict as part of the global war between the West and Islamic Terrorism. From a historical perspective, as Avi Shlaim contends, “Zionism was to be permanently allied with [Euro-American] colonialism against all the Arabs in the Eastern Mediterranean”. In many respects, Israel’s poetics of the Iran-Palestine collusion are part of that incessant Zionist/Israeli campaign.

Conclusion

Few Iranians would disagree with the pro-Palestinian policy of the Iranian government since 1979. In recent years, however, support for the Palestinians has been driven less by ideological fervor than by a discourse on “social justice”. A former member of the Revolutionary Guards summed up what appear to be typical Iranian views on the conflict: “We can’t tell the Palestinians how to negotiate with the Israelis. All Palestinians whom I’ve met […] want peace. But something has to be done for the refugees. Their situation is desperate.” Thus, while we must take Ahmadinejad’s recent anti-Israel rhetoric at face value, we must also be able to put this rhetoric into perspective. Indeed, there’s clearly a growing consensus among politically aware Iranians that their interest lay not in the annihilation of Israel but in a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Clearly, too, there has been a growing lack of
interest among other Iranians with issues of the conflict, with some even advocating Iran’s
total disengagement from it. An Iranian political science professor expressed this sentiment
thus: “The Arabs and Israelis have been fighting for [many] years […]. This is regrettable,
but we must not become involved. We have enough problems here in our own country.” It
is unlikely that Iran would disengage from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict any time soon.
However, in the light of the foregoing discussion it is fairly plausible to argue that present-
day Iran gives voice to multiple perspectives on the conflict that don’t necessarily fall into
line with the notion of replacing Israel with Palestine by force. What is also patently clear is
that the Islamic Republic of Iran has more important fish to fry than to expend all of its
energies and resources on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Notes
2. Said, Edward, Culture and Imperialism, Vintage, New York 1993, p. 72. In the same vein, Gyanendra Pandey con-
tends, “history [...] is presented as a matter of natural, automatic and autonomous growth, and immaculate concep-
tion – uninfluenced, except in a contingent way, by the development of world capitalism, European dominance, sci-
entific racism and other related phenomena”. See Pandey, Gyanendra, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and
4. Nandy, Ashis, Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1993,
P. 55.
6. Ram, Haggai, Reading Iran in Israel: Self and Other, Religion and Modernity, Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Tel Aviv 2006,
chapter 2 (in Hebrew).
10. It was within this context that Senator Arlen Spector hosted Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Hadi Nejad Hosseinian,
at a dinner on Capitol Hill in October 2001. Also at the opening of the UN General Assembly in November, the Iranian
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi shook hands with Secretary of State Colin Powell. According to the Washington Post
(29 October 2001), this was the first public gesture between cabinet-level members of the US and Iranian governments
in more than twenty years.
12. See e.g. “The US attempts to come closer to Iran: Congress members dine with [Iranian] ambassador [to the UN]”,
Ha’aretz, 30 October 2001; Benn, Ahuf, in Ha’aretz, 15 December 2001.
15. Limor, Yoav, “Iran’s real face has been exposed”, Ma’ariv, 6 January 2002; Ma’ariv, 7 January 2002. Head of
Military Intelligence, Aharon Ze’evi, voiced similar views in Ma’ariv, 23 January 2002.
See also note 1.
18. GRANOT, Oded, in Ma’ariv, 13 January 2002.
19. See e.g. ARENS, Moshe, “It’s been so pleasant to hear”, Ha’aretz, 5 February 2002; BENN, Ahuf, “Please don’t disrupt the war against the ‘axis of evil’”, Ha’aretz, 6 February 2002.
22. See e.g. remarks by Rafsanjani as cited in Khalayy Times, 25 October 2005.
23. MENASHRI, David, “Preface”, in TSAPRIR, Eliezer (Geizi), Small Satan, Big Satan: Revolution and Escape in Iran, Ma’ariv, Tel Aviv 2002, p. 12.
30. These aspects of the Iran-Israel connection also refute the allegation that Iran’s hostility to Israel is rooted in theology only.
31. FARHANG, Mansour, op. cit.
38. SHAPIRA, Shimon, Hizbullah between Iran and Lebanon, Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Tel Aviv 2000, pp. 55-76 (in Hebrew).
39. FARHANG, Mansour, op. cit., p. 87.
42. FARHANG, Mansour, op. cit., p. 88.
43. RAMAZANI, Rouhollah K., op. cit., 1988, pp. 151-152.
46. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 93.