
TREASON OF THE INTELLECTUALS? ISRAELI SOCIOLOGISTS AND THE COLONIAL OCCUPATION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

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The oft-quoted term *treason of the intellectuals* was first coined by French philosopher Julien Benda in the 1920s.¹ Benda's book – in which he criticized his contemporaries, including university professors, authors, or religious leaders for their nationalist political sentiments – is certainly a product of its historical era. Noticeably, the term *treason of the intellectuals* has been twisted, since then, and has become an idiomatic-phrase that signifies the exact opposite: the silence of intellectuals and their “neutrality” vis-à-vis the major political issues of their period. It addresses persons-of-letter who choose to remain silence, or aloof to political immorality, usually hiding behind the pale banner of political “neutrality”. This is certainly a notable characteristic of the intelligentsia today. In order to bring Benda up to date I believe that we need to turn around two of his assumptions. First, to narrow down his definition of “the intellectual”. Benda's categorization includes every possible person who may be defined potentially as an intellectual: academics, authors, journalists, and artists. I will show that such a definition is anachronistic and is not sufficiently dynamic, as it identifies an intellectual according to her a-priori position in a society, rather than according to her revealed action. Second, Benda encouraged intellectuals to adhere to a norm of disinterestedness. In contrast, I argue that under certain conditions, intellectuals cannot entertain the privilege of political or moral “neutrality”. As one man-of-letters told his daughter who claimed to have been not interested in politics: “you may not be interested in politics, but the political is interested in you”. According to this re-formulation, intellectuals are not necessarily those who occupy positions in the university, or in the literary sphere for that matter, but rather those who use their authority and skills in their own fields of knowledge in order to make significant interventions in morally urgent matters outside their area of expertise. Such were Emil Zola, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, George Orwell, Franz Fanon or Edward Said – to use the great exemplars of recent intellectual history.

In the following I look at the state of Israeli sociology in the light of the political reality in the Middle East. First, I examine the extent to which Israeli sociologists function as intel-

lectuals, that is, the extent to which they have responded to pressing moral issues in their surrounding reality. I will show that most Israeli sociologists refrain from taking public positions on these moral issues, usually hiding behind the banner of academic neutrality. In the context of these results, I will argue that whereas it is essential to protect sociology from the tyranny of politics – as Weber firmly believed – it is equally important to protect politics from the neutrality of sociology. Second, I will focus on the flip side of this phenomenon, examining the extent to which the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories has shaped the research and teaching agenda of Israeli sociologists. Here I will show that despite its durability and dominance, the occupation never emerged as a central paradigm, or at least as a central topic of investigation, in Israeli sociology. I will finally show that there is a common thread that ties (a) the absence of sociology from political reality; and (b) the absence of political reality from sociology. I start with a brief description of the political reality in the occupied Palestinian territories.

The political reality in the occupied Palestinian territories

Out of its 58 years of existence, the state of Israel has exercised direct occupation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza for 39 years. During this period over 4 million Palestinians, devoid of the rights of citizenship, have been subjected to military rule while their towns and villages have been surrounded or sealed off.

Approximately 2,700 Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli army since October 2000, 20% of them children under the age of 18. At least 150 Palestinians have been assassinated by Israeli military squads without a trial. Some 11,000 houses have been demolished or sealed since 1967, 570 of them in the last 3 years, mainly as a form of punishment. Amnesty reports that many Palestinians are malnourished, some even in a state of starvation.

While Israel attempts to describe its military action as legitimate self defense in the face of horrifying anti-Israeli suicide terrorist attacks – the history of the occupation reveals a long term demographic project which includes territorial expansion through settlement building and ethnic cleansing. To be sure, ethnic cleansing is not genocide.² It is a systematic territorial project by which one ethnic group is driven out of its territory by the use of military force, violence, and the on-going threat of violence.³

This long-term project is supported and legitimized by an ideology of Jewish supremacy. While one might debate the nuances of underlying ideological beliefs, it is an undeniable fact that the Jewish state backs paramilitary squads of settlers who harass the Palestinians on a daily basis and massively supports both their expropriation of land and expansion. They drive them off their lands, cutting off their water supply and bulldozing their orchards and vegetation.

In the last two decades alone, the Jewish settlers have destroyed 70,000 dunam (one dunam is 1,000 square meters) of agricultural fields and appropriated approximately 100,000 dunam for the expansion of their settlements. It is not uncommon for the settlers to redirect their waste pipes into Palestinian villages, which receive them as open sewage. I have witnessed some of these events first hand.

The ethos expressed by the Israeli Zionist left is founded on a misleading distinction between “us” and “them”. From the typical liberal point of view, “them” are the “bad guys”, the settlers who live “out there” on Palestinian lands; and the “us” are the “good guys” who

live within the boundaries of the green line and oppose the occupation. True, many of the settlers' behavior is indeed repulsive and many Israeli liberals mean well. But, sociologically speaking, the distinction between "us" and "them" is simplistic and often hides the extent to which "We" support, by omission or commission, knowingly or not, the occupation. It is "We" who send our kids to the army, it is "We" who teach soldiers in the universities, it is "We" who consume industrial products produced in the territories. Anybody who pays a visit to a Jewish settlement today would notice how naturally the Israeli business community – which often espouses liberal positions with regard to the occupation – provides the infrastructure that keeps the occupation machine going: telephone lines, TV cables, gas, electricity, water, internet connections, food supplies, architecture. This kind of support has become a taken-for-granted set of practices that fuel the occupation. Tacit support for the occupation is not limited to the business community. It has penetrated into academic institutions as well. Only recently, a choir from a West Bank settlement performed in a Tel-Aviv University graduation ceremony. Thus, the distinction between "Us" and "Them" once embodied by the green line, is like the green line itself, increasingly blurred. The occupation has increasingly become part and parcel of the society in Israel, not a remote and separate reality.

To make myself perfectly clear, let me emphasize that I believe that the suicide bombings of innocent Israeli civilians – several hundreds of them have been killed in the last 5 years – are crimes against humanity, if one is to use the same legal terminology applied to the practices of the occupation. I also think that suicide bombings are detrimental to the Palestinian cause. One reason, among many, is that they create the appearance of symmetry between Israeli and Palestinian violence. Such symmetry, however, is false. While Israel is a sovereign state, the Palestinian struggle is fragmented, desperate and decentralized, even if at times it is supported by countries such as Syria and Iran. All democratic regimes rest their authority on the power of a sovereign sword which monopolizes the means of violence. The Israeli government, if anything, deliberately crushed the Palestinian Authority and curtailed its ability to monopolize the means of violence within the Palestinian authority. The frailness of the Palestinian Authority was particularly evident after the pull-out of the Israeli army, and of the Jewish settlers, from the Gaza strip in the summer of 2005. It serves the Israeli government to claim that "there is no partner" for negotiation, to legitimize the Balkanization of the West-Bank into three, Bantustan-like entities and to annex the Jewish settlements into the sovereign territory of the state of Israel.

Do sociologists have a role in such political reality?

Do sociologists have a role in this political reality? Are they obliged to respond to it? To study it? To understand it? The answer, I would like to argue, is a resounding Yes.

The relationship between sociology and politics pushes the boundaries of the discipline to the limit. Cohorts of sociologists have stayed away from politics in order to protect their work and the core of their discipline. Robert Proctor's excellent book *Value-Free Science?*⁴ describes in detail the genealogy of the dangerous liaisons between sociology and politics. Nevertheless, generations of sociologists also criticized "objectivity" and "neutrality" as the ideology of alienated or politically homeless sociologists.⁵ This has been argued time and again by sociologists such as C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner, Lewis Coser, and Zygmunt Bauman, not to mention critical theorists such as Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, or Walter Benjamin.

Recently, Michael Burawoy, president of the American Sociological Association, made an appeal to expand the role of sociologists to include engagement with public issues in the US and beyond.⁶ It seems that Burawoy is not very explicit about the role of public sociologists facing moral issues, particularly when they do not fall within the boundaries of their expertise. Burawoy does not make it explicit that sociologists ought to intervene in morally urgent matters. When he refers to “the political” it seems to denote politics of redistribution and politics of recognition – issues of class and identity.⁷ Whereas I do not deny the importance of these issues – which in themselves represent a big leap in the propensity of the discipline to deal with political issues – the pressing moral issues seem to remain outside the scope of sociologists’ discourse. In particular, I am not sure that Burawoy provided sufficient consideration – in defining the role of public sociologists – to situations like the one in the Middle East today, in which crimes against humanity have become an everyday practice. I believe that the definition of public sociology should be sharpened and made explicit, to respond to what Franz Fanon called, in the context of the Algerian war, “the exigency of the situation”. Moreover, the definition of public sociology does not seem to preclude sociologists from supporting or collaborating with problematic or even immoral state practices. For example numerous Israeli sociologists – the Israeli version of American Neocons – provide professional services, as public sociologists, to governmental agencies and defense-related organizations. The political ramifications of their actions are often masked by the technocratic parlance and their expertise.

In contrast, I believe that under some political conditions like the one in the Middle-East today, sociologists ought to take action under the banner of public intellectuals in order to respond to morally disturbing events. While admittedly rooted in a romantic vision of “the intellectual”, public intellectualism continues a rich tradition that grants individual scholars the legitimacy to speak out and intervene in critical issues of their time, those that lie beyond the narrowly-defined fence of expertise. Only a continuous belief in the tradition of public intellectualism, which suspends the dogma of academic neutrality, can provide a significant moral role to sociologists in those situations.

As said, there are multiple definitions of “the intellectual”. Lewis Coser has suggested that intellectuals are those who manufacture and disseminate cultural symbols.⁸ Namely, an intellectual is a producer of symbols, a person who can name-and-frame a situation. Such a definition, however, is too similar to Benda’s, since they employ an *a priori* definition which assumes *a priori* who is an intellectual. Unlike Benda, or scholars such as Mannheim, Gramsci, Shils, Coser, Collins or Foucault,⁹ I do not hold an *a-priori* definition of the intellectual. Rather, I prefer a tautological one, defining intellectuals after the fact, according to their revealed preferences and action.

According to this definition, a person is defined as an intellectual only when she makes a leap from his or her own field of expertise, to the rather risky field of morality and ethics. Thus, sociologists, writers or scientists are not intellectuals because they are sociologists, writers or scientists. They become intellectuals only when they cross the boundaries and are willing to engage in morally urgent issues. This occurs when they are ready to leave “the warm cradle of national consensus” as Orwell put it, or to “confront orthodoxy and dogma in Edward Said’s words”.¹⁰ The late Yeshayahu Lebovitz and Israel Shahak were such individuals. In the American context one can name individuals like Albert Einstein, Hannah Arendt, Noam Chomsky,¹¹ and more recently Toni Judt who admirably criticized the oppression of Palestinians,

the political uses of the Holocaust to justify violence, the Israeli assassination squads, and the rather disturbing unconditional support of many American Jews for Israel.¹²

The definition I offer is founded on three complementary components: (a) The subject; that is, who can be named an intellectual? (b) The field; that is, what is the terrain in which intellectuals act? (c) Representation; that is, who is represented by the intellectual? Let me start with the question of the “subject”. The previously discussed definitions are plausible, but they do not take into account their engagement (or lack of) in the moral field. I define an intellectual not according to their *a priori* position but rather according to their revealed action. An intellectual can be named as such if she occupies a position in one field (literature, academia, poetry, law, science) and acts to transfer her symbolic currency into another: the political and moral field. In order to position herself as an intellectual, a person needs to be able to cross the lines, to use her reputation in order to act in matters of ethics and morality. A true intellectual is a traveler. She travels around, observes, speaks out, often finds herself in eternal homelessness. Like any other definition, this too is a tautological one. We will be able to name an intellectual only after they have acted or spoke out. Such definition keeps – at the same time – one’s position in their own respective field of expertise. If she is a physicist or a sociologist, we do not expect her to politicize physics or sociology. They maintain the separating fence between their regular field of action and the moral field into which they migrated temporarily.

The second component is the “field”. There needs to be a space from which one can speak out and act freely. The quintessential example is the court jester, who often risked his life for stating the truth. The university should have been such a site for intellectualism, but often is not. Reasons are ample. Partly this reflects on the positivist ethos which dominates the humanities and the social sciences and funnels them into the apolitical track which the natural sciences have paved for themselves. Partly it is to protect the sciences from politics and to keep “science” and “values” separate. The third reason is fear. In the late nineteenth-century, for example, German sociologists withstood the state’s attempts to shut down university departments. In order to legitimize sociological research in the eyes of the political regime, German sociologists refrained from engagement with the three pressing political issues of their period: socialism, feminism and eugenics. Thus, amid the struggle for survival, sociologists articulated a new rhetoric of neutrality. As Ferdinand Tonnies put it most succinctly: “As sociologists we are neither for nor against socialism, neither for nor against the expansion of women’s right, neither for nor against the mixing of the races. In each of these, however, we do find questions for empirical social research: in social policy, social pedagogy, and social hygiene. In this, sociology finds its proper boundaries without taking upon itself the task of furthering, or obstructing, particular ideas or movements.”¹³ Value neutrality was an ideology of sociologists under siege. Thus, intellectual life necessitates a field, a space, from which they can speak out and act. It requires autonomy vis-à-vis politics and vis-à-vis the state, it requires a legitimate position within civil society. Jacques Derrida believed that such autonomy would be reached only in “cosmopolitan cities”, urban and legal settings which can become safe havens for intellectual activity.

The third component is “re-presentation”. It focuses on the question of who – or what – is represented by the intellectual. As opposed to accepted conventions, I do not believe that an intellectual needs to represent an existing constituency or a group of people.

The intellectual may represent a possibility, an option that does not exist in reality, a utopia. As such, he provides an alternative direction, or a new moral roadmap. Under these circumstances the intellectual may have zero followers, and he may remain in eternal solitude. An intellectual idea should not be judged according to the extent of public support. On the contrary, most intellectual thought was perceived as heterodox, as heresy, when it was first conceived. Robert Musil puts it most concisely in his description of man-without-qualities: “If one wants to pass through open doors easily, one must bear in mind that they have a solid frame: this principle, according to which the old professor had always lived, is simply a requirement of the sense of reality. But if there is such a thing as a sense of reality – and no one will doubt that it has its *raison d’être* – then there must also be something that one can call a sense of possibility [...]. So the sense of possibility might be defined outright as the capacity to think how everything could ‘just as easily’ be, and to attach no more importance to what is than to what is not.”¹⁴ The intellectual is thus accountable not only to what is, but also to what “ought” to be, according to her best judgment and vision of the good society. She is refuting teleological narratives (such as “we need to take security measures in order to defend our lives”) and marks the road not taken.

In the light of this discussion, I ask to what extent do Israeli sociologists function as public intellectuals? Do they capitalize on their position and use their intellectual skills, power of reasoning and interpretation – to speak out and act against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories?

To answer this question I created a database of all Israeli sociologists at 5 major universities. I searched for people who made at least two public appearances in the media (Israeli newspapers, foreign newspapers, TV, radio, public demonstrations) and criticized (or for that matter supported) the occupation, the construction of the wall, the assassination of Palestinians or supported refusal to serve in the army, including those who were against refusal. Any sociologist who met one of the criteria on this rather minimal list was defined as a public intellectual.

I then went on to look for other indicators of political involvement such as signing petitions, or being members of protest organizations. Whereas these are not measures of plain public intellectualism, it provides information on the extent to which Israeli sociologists are willing to use their name and prestige to make political statements.

Israeli sociologists in practice

Table 1 presents ethnic, national and gender characteristics of Israeli sociologists.

Table 1 / Israeli sociologists by ethnicity and gender

	ALL FACULTY MEMBERS	PALESTINIAN	MIZRAHI WOMEN	MIZRAHI MEN	ASHKENAZI WOMEN	ASHKENAZI MEN
Tel Aviv University	29	1	1	3	6	18
Hebrew University	35	0	2	1	8	24
Haifa University	29	1	1	1	8	18
Ben Gurion University	16	0	1	2	5	8
Bar Ilan University	24	0	1	1	8	14
Total	133	2 (1.5%)	6 (4.5%)	8 (6%)	34 (26%)	83 (63%)

Table 2 presents the involvement of Israeli sociologists as public intellectuals.

Table 2 / **Israeli sociologists as public intellectuals, N=133**

	PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS	MEMBERS OF PROTEST ORGANIZATIONS	HARDCORE MEMBERS	SIGNED AT LEAST ONE	SIGNED AT LEAST TWO
Number	8	22	6	24	7
Percentage	6%	17%	4%	18%	5%

Table 3 compares sociologists to historians and philosophers.

Table 3 / **Sociologists, philosophers and historians as public intellectuals**

DISCIPLINE	PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS	SIGNED A SUPPORTING	PETITION REFUSAL	N
Sociology	8 (6%)	17 (13%)		133
Philosophy	8 (9%)	22 (24%)		91
History	13 (6%)	25 (13%)		204

Only 6 percent of Israeli sociologists perform the role of public intellectuals and voice their opinions publicly. As a comparison, 9 percent of Israeli philosophers exert commitment to moral and political issues. I leave it to you to decide whether these numbers are high or low.

What are the reasons for what I perceive as low participation? One general reason is provided by Richard Posner in his book *Public Intellectuals*. Academic neutrality, backed by the tenure contract, makes the university career safe and comfortable. And this breeds aloofness and complacency on moral issues. Not only do academicians feel comfortable where they are, some of them sometimes vilify public intellectualism in order for it to justify their own choice.

In the Israeli context, there is strong pressure from senior colleagues, self-nominated gatekeepers, who use their position of power to intimidate young faculty, particularly those without tenure, who are troubled by the political situation and wish to respond publicly to it

Pressure comes from outside the university as well. For example, on March 31, 2004, the president of Ben-Gurion University of Beer Sheba received a 6-page letter from the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA): “We are writing to express our concerns about the vehemently anti-Israel actions of one of your lecturers, Dr. Neve Gordon. In researching Dr. Gordon’s publications, we have not uncovered a single article in which he sympathizes with Israeli victims of terror, or with Israel’s efforts to protect its citizens. He has called Israel a ‘fascist’ and ‘terrorist’ state, repeatedly compared Israel to apartheid South Africa, and endorsed general boycotts against Israel, at a time when the country is dealing with a battered economy brought about in part by the terrorist onslaught [...]. We are alarmed that, given his obvious contempt for Israel as the Jewish homeland, Dr. Gordon is being awarded with a continued teaching position at a university that was named after one of the fathers of Zionism who helped realize the long-cherished dream of a homeland for the Jewish people [...]. We intend to make our members – many of them are supporters of Ben-Gurion University – aware of Neve Gordon’s activities and of his position on the faculty of the University”. To be sure,

this is not an unusual or one-time incident. They take place on a regular basis. On April 2004, the Israeli Education Minister sent a strongly worded letter to the President of the university, saying that she intended to boycott the university and the university's board of governors meetings as long as Prof. Lev Grinberg – an Israeli sociologist who regularly writes against the occupation – continues to serve as a lecturer at the university.¹⁵

Two years ago the same minister asked the attorney general to consider the possibility of prosecuting Hebrew University lecturers who signed a petition supporting the right of IDF soldiers to refuse to serve in the territories. At the same time the education minister also called for the establishment of a committee headed by a retired judge to look into why on Holocaust Remembrance Day, the head of the David Yellin College allowed Arab students to stand in a minute of silence in memory of Palestinians killed in IDF actions.

The Minister of Education is not alone. Intimidation comes from donors, and the public at large. Such was the case with Lord George Wiedenfled, chairman of the board of trustees of Ben-Gurion University, and one of the biggest philanthropists in the British Jewish community, who told a reporter that although the Minister of Education should not have imposed sanctions on the university, he finds it dismaying that the university is disseminating such views as those of Dr. Grinberg.¹⁶

Whereas I do not have exact numbers on people denied tenure because of their political views, these examples attest to the organizational culture in Israeli universities today.

The colonial occupation as a research paradigm: sociology of denial

Given the fact that sociologists do not respond publicly to the political reality around them, a second related question is to what extent they address aspects of the political reality in their sociological work. To that end, I examined to what extent the occupation has become a research paradigm, or to what extent aspects of the occupation figure centrally in the work of Israeli sociologists. The results are even grimmer.

Table 4 / **Teaching and research interest in the occupation among Israeli sociologists, N =133**

	TEACH A DIRECT COURSE ON THE OCCUPATION	CONDUCTING DIRECT RESEARCH ON THE OCCUPATION	CONDUCTING INDIRECT RESEARCH ON THE OCCUPATION
NUMBER	1	6	13
PERCENTAGE	0,70%	4%	10%

As table 4 clearly suggests, Israeli sociologists almost completely ignore the occupation in their research and teaching. This is troubling evidence on the priorities of Israeli sociologists given the permanence of the occupation and its dominance in every aspect of Israeli society.

Liberal myopia

To be sure, postcolonial theory has offered sufficient insights to be used in the study of Israeli society in general and the occupation in particular. In fact in the early 1990s this option was almost materialized with the work of Gershon Shafir, Ilan Pappé, Uri Ram, Avishai Erlich, Baruch Kimmerling and a few others. But unfortunately, many scholars' acceptance of the Oslo accord and its epistemology redirected this effort into a paradigm which accepted, indeed took for granted, the notion of separation and a two-state solution. The imagined bor-

ders of Israeli society remained the 1949 borders during the 38-year period in which the Israeli state slowly but systematically adopted and applied the notion of a “greater Israel”.

It is evident that most Israeli sociologists have been regarding the occupation as ephemeral, as an accident or as a detour in the trajectory of the country’s history. Already in the late 1980s Baruch Kimmerling suggested extending the category of “Israeli society” to include the Israeli domination system in the occupied territories.¹⁷ So did geographer Oren Yiftachel. But researchers, mainly liberals with good intentions, apparently hoping that the occupation would one day disappear, stubbornly continued to conceptualize Israeli society within the 1967 borders. Paradoxically, their anti-occupation political position resulted in an ongoing avoidance of dealing professionally with the reality of the occupation.

The second reason has to do with the dependency of Israeli sociologists on the American academic reward structure.

Dependency on American sociology

The shortcomings of Israeli sociology have been discussed in the past, particularly its inability to develop a local theory and language appropriate to its object of study.¹⁸ The academic system in Israel encourages participation in the American reward system and supports acceptance and use of its theories, terminology, and rules of conduct.¹⁹ Many Israeli sociologists do their graduate studies in the United States and throughout their career use databases which pertain to the US. Some Israeli sociologists, in fact, have never written an article in Hebrew. This inevitably leads to alienation from the local Israeli context. Gideon Kunda’s reflexive account offers a case in point.²⁰ In the context of his own published work, he shows how in order to get published in the United States, sociologists systematically strip their studies of any local relevance.²¹ He shows how his selective interpretation of his data produced a description of subjects that could be found in any Western metropolis, be it in NY, Chicago or Boston.

Similarly, Leah Shamgar Hendelman examined the accumulative knowledge about “the Israeli family”. Reviewing 450 bibliographical items she shows that such a category was never addressed directly, since Israeli researchers found it hard to publish indigenous studies in the US. Thus, Israeli researchers tend to use ready-made conceptual frames that are produced in the American literature.

To conclude, I envisioned a sociological community which is capable of opening debates and deliberations over crucial moral issues and violations of human rights, not avoiding them. Be it the war in Iraq, the administrative detainees in Guantanamo, the exploitation, by Coca Cola, of 8 year-olds employed in sugar fields in El Salvador, or any other form of racism or anti-Semitism. At this very moment, the materialization of this vision seems farther away than ever.

Notes

1. BENDA, Julien, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, W. W. Norton and Company, New York 1928. Benda has used a wider definition than merely intellectuals and included “all those who speak to the world in a transcendental manner” including clergymen and representatives of religious institutions.

2. For the distinction between genocide and ethnic cleansing see: WEITZ, Eric D., *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2003, p. 10; WEISS, Yfaat, “Ethnic cleansing, memory and property: Europe 1944-1948”, *Historia: Journal of the Israeli Historical Society*, 13, 2004, pp. 43-74 (in Hebrew). For

a different position see: NAIMARK, Norman M., *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century Europe*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2001.

3. For the concept of *suspended violence* see: AZOULAY, Ariella and OPHIR, Adi, "The economy of violence", paper presented at the conference "The Politics of Humanitarianism in the Occupied Territories", The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 20-21 April 2004.

4. PROCTOR, Robert, *Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge*, Harvard University Press, Harvard 1991.

5. GOULDNER, Alvin, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, Basic Books, New York 1970, p. 103.

6. See, for example, BURAWOY, Michael, "Public sociologies and the grass roots", *SWS Network News: The Newsletter of Sociologists for Women in Sociology*, XX, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 13-14.

7. FRASER, Nancy, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age", *New Left Review*, vol. 212, 1985, p. 68-93.

8. COSER, Lewis, *Men of Ideas*, Free Press, New York 1965.

9. For a review see KURZMAN, Charles and OWENS, Lynn, "The Sociology of Intellectuals", *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 28, August 2002, pp. 63-90.

10. Quoted in POSNER, Richard, *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2001, p. 30. See also: HEVER, Hannan, "Notes on the position of the Israeli intellectuals", in OPHIR, Adi (ed.), *Real Time: Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Israeli Left*, Keter, Jerusalem 2001, pp. 191-196.

11. In 1948 a group of Jewish intellectuals made a collective statement asking the United States and Jewish leaders to boycott the head of the Israeli "Freedom Party", Menahem Begin, who was about to visit the US. They made the link between him and European fascism and pointed to his relation with the massacre of 240 Palestinian men, women and children in Dir Yassin: "It is inconceivable that those who oppose fascism throughout the world, if correctly informed as to Mr. Begin's political record and perspectives, could add their names and support to the movement he represents." Among these intellectuals were: Hannah Arendt, Albert Einstein, Zelig Harris, and Sidney Hook. See: ABRAMOWITZ, Isidore and others, "Attack on Arab Village", *New York Times*, 4 December 1948.

12. JUDT, Toni, "Israel: The Alternative", *New York Review of Books*, October 2003. See also: SHERMAN, Scott, "The Rebirth of the NYRB", *The Nation*, 7 June 2004, pp. 16-21.

13. PROCTOR, Robert, *Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge*, Harvard University Press, Harvard 1991, p. 92.

14. MUSIL, Robert, *The Man Without Qualities*, Secker & Warburg, London 1953/1979, p. 12.

15. LAVIE, Aviv, "Not for the faint-hearted", *Ha'aretz Weekly Supplement*, 6 May 2004.

16. Idem.

17. KIMMERLING, Baruch, "Sociology, Ideology, and Nation Building: The Palestinians and their meaning in Israeli sociology", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 57, no. 4, August 1992, pp. 446-460.

18. For a recent discussion see SHENHAV, Yehouda, "Is there an Israeli Sociology?", *Israeli Sociology*, 4, 2000, pp. 675-681 (in Hebrew).

19. Nachman, Ben-Yehuda, "The Dominance of the External: Israeli Sociology", *Contemporary Sociology*, vol. 26, no. 3, 1997, p. 271-275.

20. KUNDA, Gideon, "Criticism on Probation: Ethnography and Culture Critique in Israel", *Theory and Criticism*, 2, 1992, pp. 7-24 (in Hebrew).

21. KUNDA, Gideon, "Ideology as a System of Meaning: The Case of the Israeli Probation Service", *International Studies of Management and Organization*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1982, pp. 54-79.